Abstract. Knudsen and Berson have applied truncated differential attack on 5 round SAFER K-64 successfully. However, their attack is not efficient when applied on 5 round SAFER SK-64 (with the modified key schedule) and can not be applied on 6 round SAFER.
Introduction
In [6] , Massey proposed an encryption algorithm, SAFER K-64. It is an iterated block cipher with 64-bit block size. The suggested number of rounds is minimum 6 and maximum 10 [6, 7] . Knudsen discovered a weakness in the key schedule of SAFER and suggested a modified version [3] . Later, this new key schedule was adopted by Massey which resulted in SAFER SK-64 [8] . Also, Massey suggested 8 rounds to be used for SAFER with 64-bit key. The other variants of SAFER with 128-bit key are SAFER K-128 and SAFER SK-128 corresponding to SAFER K-64 and SAFER SK-64, respectively.
Evidence was given in [7] that SAFER is secure against differential cryptanalysis [1] after 5 rounds. In [2] , SAFER is shown to be secure against linear cryptanalysis [9] after 2 rounds. In [5] , Knudsen and Berson applied truncated differential cryptanalysis [6] on 5 round SAFER K-64 successfully. Their result showed that the secret key of 5 round SAFER K-64 can be found much faster than by exhaustive search. However, their attack is not efficient when applied on 5 round SAFER SK-64. Also, their attack cannot be extended to attack 6 round SAFER since too many wrong pairs are not filtered out.
In this paper, we improve the truncated differential cryptanalysis and apply it on 5 round and 6 round SAFER. We propose better truncated differential and additional filtering method in our attacks. For 5 round SAFER (both SAFER K-64 and SAFER SK-64), our truncated differential is with probability of about 2 -69 in average and about 2 38 chosen plaintexts (a large reduction in the amount of chosen plaintexts) are needed to find the secret key. This attack runs in time similar to 2 46 encryptions of 5-round SAFER. For 6 round SAFER, our truncated differential has a probability of about 2 encryptions of 6-round SAFER. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the SAFER algorithms. Section 3 introduces Knudsen and Berson's truncated differential attack on 5 round SAFER K-64. In Section 4, we present our attack on 5 round SAFER. Our attacks on 6 round SAFER are given in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the strength of 7 round SAFER and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Description of SAFER
SAFER K-64 is an iterated block cipher with both block and key sizes of 64 bits and with all the operations done on bytes. The key is expanded to 2r + 1 round keys each of 8 bytes, where the round number r was suggested to be 6 [6] and then 8 [8] , respectively. Each round takes 8 bytes of text input and two round keys each of 8 bytes. Each round consists of 4 layers as shown in Fig. 1 .
The first layer consists of xor'ing or adding modulo 256 with the first round key. In the second layer, the 8 bytes pass through two permutations or S-boxes:
, and the inverse of 
where each coordinate is taken modulo 256. After the last round, an output transformation is applied, which consists of xor'ing or adding modulo 256 with the last round key and is the same as the first layer of the round operation. We call this the last half round in the rest of the paper.
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The 128-bit version of SAFER differs from the 64-bit version SAFER in the suggested number of rounds which is 10 and in the key schedule [7] . The key schedule consists of two sub-schedules each dealing with 64-bit key separately. The odd number round keys are taken from the first sub-schedule and the even number round keys from the second. A 128-bit schedule is compatible with its 64-bit version if the two 64-bit key halves input to the key schedule are equal.
Knudsen and Berson's Truncated Differential Attack on SAFER
Knudsen introduced the concept of truncated differential attack in [4] . Truncated differential is a differential that predicts only parts of an n-bit value. Knudsen and Berson applied truncated differential attack on 5 round SAFER K-64 successfully [5] . Their attack can find the key in time much faster than by exhaustive search. 
Truncated Differential of SAFER
The notation of "expanded view" from [7] is used to denote a one round differential by three tuples of each 8 entries. The first tuple indicates the difference in the 8 bytes of the inputs to the round, the second tuple indicates the difference of the bytes before the PHT -transformation and the third tuple indicates the difference of the bytes after the PHT -transformation, i.e. the difference of the outputs of the round (it is also the difference of the inputs of the next round). A difference of two bytes ( (table 4 to table 10) of [7] . The properties of the S boxes and used in obtaining the round differential are listed in table 3 of [6] . Knudsen and Berson listed the one round truncated differentials (together with the probability) for SAFER with inputs different in less than or equal to four bytes in table 2 and table 3 of [5] . For example, the following one round truncated differential is with probability 2 X ( ) L However, when the one round truncated differentials are concatenated, its feasibility need be considered. This problem has been mentioned in [7] . Specifically, we note that the input difference of 128 to the S boxes cannot result in output difference of 128. Thus some one round truncated differential like 24→24 cannot be concatenated with itself. It is also noted that the input difference of 128 to the exponential permutation X results in odd output difference. Thus some one round differentials like 5→78 and 78→3478 cannot be concatenated.
Knudsen and Berson's Truncated Differential Attack on 5 Round SAFER K-64
Before introducing Knudsen and Berson's truncated differential attack on 5 round SAFER, the proposition 4 in [7] is given below: Proposition 1. For byte differences and as stated in [5] . However, this small error does not affect Knudsen and Berson's attack too much.
The probabilities in the first two rounds are each of 2 -16 and the probability in the third round is 2 -24
. Now we look at the differential in the fourth round. For the first two differentials, the differential in the fourth round is , which can be found by direct calculation. However, for the last two differentials, the differential in the forth round is , which is also found by direct calculation. So the probabilities are each of 2 -71.68 for the first two differentials and 2 -72.19 for the last two differentials. The probability for the 4-round differential is thus 2 -69. 9 , not 2 -69.7 as stated in [5] . This 4-round differential is concatenated with the fifth round differential where the value of x is odd. This differential has probability 1 since the input difference 128 to the exponential permutation table always yields an odd output difference.
After the final output transformation consisting of byte wise xor'ing and add'ing with the last round key, the output difference is:
where x is odd, z 1 and z 3 are even number while z 2 and z 4 are odd number according to c) of proposition 1. The probability for this truncated differential is 2 -69.9
. The filtering processes are carried out at the last half round and the first round. The filtering at the last half round is carried out firstly. Note that the difference at the second byte of the ciphertexts (denoted as x) should be odd. The differences in bytes 3, 6 and 7 have values 2x, x and 2x, respectively. The differences at the first and fifth bytes are even and the difference at the forth and eighth bytes are odd. After considering these, all but one out of 2 29 pairs are discarded. 2 41 pairs are left and each of the pair suggests 16 values of the bytes 1, 4, 5 and 8 of the last round key. Next, the filtering process is carried out at the first round. After checking whether the suggested key yields the desired difference at the output of the first round, every pair suggests about 16×2
- In the filtering process at the last half round, sorting n items requires about n simple operations. A method is given in [5] to reduce the time requirements for the first filtering process. Let a ciphertext be denoted which is hashed to . The ciphertexts with the same hash value are candidates for a right pair after the first filtering process. Thus, the complexity is reduced to n simple operations. n log ) ,..., ( 2 7 ) and runs in about the same time (if the filtering time is not considered).
Attack on 5 Round SAFER SK-64
Our attack on 5 round SAFER SK-64 uses the following 4-round truncated differential with input difference 
The probabilities in the first round and the third round are each of 2 -24 and the probability in the second round is 2 -8 . Now we look at the differential in the fourth round. For those differentials with 1256 → 15 at the third round, the differential in the fourth round is The probability for this round differential also varies with values of the key and is larger than 2 -15.7 on average. So the probabilities are each of 2 -72 for half of the differentials and 2 -71.7 for another half of the differentials. The probability for the 4-round differential is thus larger than 2 -68.9 on average. This 4-round differential is concatenated with the fifth round differential This differential has probability 1.
where z 1 and z 3 are even numbers while the least significant bits of z 2 and z 4 are the same as that of x according to c) of Proposition 1. The probability for this differential is about 2 -68.9
. About 2 69 pairs are needed to get one right pair. Every structure consisting of 2 32 chosen plaintexts yields about 2 63 pairs with the desired input difference. 64 such structures are required to get one right pair, a total of 2 38 plaintexts. The analysis can be performed on each structure and thus the memory requirements are 2 32 64-bit quantities.
The filtering processes are carried out at the last half round, the first round and the fifth round. The filtering process at the last half round is very similar to that in Knudsen However, an additional filtering process at the fifth round will reduce the complexity of the key search by a factor of 2 8 . This additional filtering process is the major improvement of our filtering processes compared with that of Knudsen and Berson. Before introducing this filtering process at the fifth round, we first present the following theorem. . So the probability of the truncated differential for the first two rounds is 2 -
Theorem 1. Consider the following two equations (
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. The filtering process at the first round has the filtering power of about 2 16 (which means that it is able to discard all but one out of 2 16 suggested keys). Let's consider one of the truncated differentials used in our attack 5678 → 12 → 1256 → 15 → 7.
The probabilities for the first round and second round are 2 -24 and 2 -8 respectively. So the probability of the truncated differential for the first two rounds is 2 -32 . This probability is the same as that of Knudsen and Berosn. But the filtering process at the first round has the filtering power of about 2 24 , about 2 8 times larger than that in Knudsen and Berson's attack. So we see that the differential in our attack increases the filtering power at the first round by a factor of about 2 8 while keeping the probabilities almost the same as that in Knudsen and Berson's attack (when we consider only one of the differentials).
An additional filtering process at the fifth round is also used in our attack. A similar filtering process can be applied in Knudsen and Berson's attack and can increase the filtering power by a factor of about 2 7 .
5 Round SAFER K-64, SAFER K-128 and SAFER SK-128
Our attack on 5 round SAFER K-64 is very similar to that on 5 round SAFER SK-64. The same differential is used and the same result is obtained. Our attack is much better than the attack on 5 round SAFER K-64 in [5] as mentioned at the beginning of this section.
For 5 round SAFER K-128, the attack in [5] is better than of ours. Applying our attack to 5 round SAFER K-128 directly, 2 38 chosen plaintexts suggest 2 63 values for 80 bits of the key. The filtering process is much tedious and it is infeasible to repeat the attack since the memory requirement is too large.
For 5 round SAFER SK-128, our attack seems better than the attack in [5] since here our truncated differential and the filtering process can predict 17 bits information of the 128-bit key while Knudsen and Berson's attack can determine only two bits of the key. However, both our attack and the attack in [5] cannot be carried out in reasonable time. Knudsen and Berson's attack is not successful to 6 round SAFER [5] . We improve their attack by using similar methods as we used in attacking 5 round SAFER. Our differential attack on 6 round SAFER (SAFER K-64 and SAFER SK-64) needs about 2 53 chosen plaintexts and runs in time similar to 2 61 encryptions of 6-round SAFER.
Attack on 6 Round SAFER

Attack on 6 Round SAFER-K64
Consider the following 5-round truncated differential with input difference where the value of x is odd. This differential has probability 1 since an input difference 128 to the exponentiation permutation always yields an odd output difference.
Therefore we obtain a 6 round truncated differential with input difference [0, 0, a, b, 0, 0, c, d] and output difference [2x, x, 2x, x, 2x, x, 2x, x] for odd x and with a probability 16 × 2 -87.9 = 2 -83.9
. We need about 2 84 pairs to get one right pair. We can use structures of each 2 32 plaintexts yielding 2 63 pairs with the desired difference in the inputs. Therefore about 2 21 structures are needed, a total of 2 53 plaintexts. We can perform our analysis on each structure and thus the memory requirements are 2 32 64-bit quantities.
After the final transformation in SAFER, the output difference is
where x is odd and z 1 and z 3 are even numbers while z 2 and z 4 are odd numbers. The filtering processes are carried out at the last half round, the first round and the sixth round. Firstly, we carry out the filtering process at the last half round. This is the same as that in Knudsen units. Then we carry out the filtering process at the sixth round. It will increase the filtering power by a factor of 2 7 . Before the discussion of this filtering process, we introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
Consider the following two equations where denotes the logarithmic permutation: 
V ∆ V ∆
For the fifth round, the fourth byte of the output of the S box is expressed as 
Attack on 6 round SAFER SK-64
To attack 6 round SAFER SK-64, we use the same truncated differential and similar filtering process as that in the attack of 6 round SAFER K-64. This attack needs about 2 53 chosen plaintexts and runs in time similar to 2 61 encryptions of 6-round SAFER. The result is the same as that obtained in the attack on 6 round SAFER K-64.
The filtering processes carried out at the last half round is the same as that in the attack of 6 round SAFER K-64. After this filtering process, about 2 55 pairs are left, each pair suggests 16 values for the bytes 1, 4, 5 and 8 of the last round key. It is the same as to say that 16 values of k 2 k 4 , k 7 and k 8 are suggested by each remaining pair. The filtering processes at the first round and the sixth round are different from those in Section 5.1 due to the difference in key schedules. Next, we carry out the filtering process at the first round. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we improved the truncated differential attack on 5 round SAFER SK-64. We also carried out attacks on 6 round SAFER K-64 and SAFER SK-64. Our attack on 5 round SAFER SK-64 can find out the secret key in time much faster than by exhaustive search. Also, our attack uses less chosen plaintexts compared with Knudsen and Berson's attack. Our attack on 6 round SAFER runs in time faster than by exhaustive search. However, our attack is not efficient when applied to 7 round SAFER. We strongly believe that 8 round SAFER is invulnerable to our attacks.
